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Abstract
This paper deals with environmental policy in an economic federa-
tion, where each national government faces a mixed tax problem. We
assume that the federal government sets emission targets, which are
implemented at the national level. We also assume that the economic
federation is decentralized, meaning that the national governments
are ﬁrst movers vis-a-vis the federal government. Our results show
that each country uses it policy instruments, at least in part, to in-
ﬂuence the emission target. This has several implications; ﬁrst, the
commodity taxes do not satisfy the so called additivity property often
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1emphasized in earlier literature and, second, it provides an argument
for using distortionary labor income taxation.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A considerable amount of research eﬀort has been put into studying so called
transboundary environmental problems. Transboundary environmental dam-
age means that the emissions generated by each country do not only aﬀect
the welfare of domestic residents; they also aﬀect the welfare of residents in
other jurisdictions. To deal with such resource allocation problems, some
kind of cooperation is generally required. This is so because, in the absence
of cooperation, part of the external eﬀects of environmental damage may
remain uninternalized, since country-speciﬁc objectives can be expected to
govern the policies decided upon by national governments. Clearly, the ideas
behind policy coordination have gained much attention also among policy-
makers: an indication is the existence of several international arrangements
ranging from voluntary agreements between politically independent coun-
tries, such as the Kyoto protocol, to arrangements within given institutional
structures, such as the environmental policy cooperation within the Euro-
pean Union (EU).
This paper analyzes environmental policy as part of an optimal tax prob-
lem facing the member states of an economic federation, which will be de-
signed to reﬂect some of the characteristics of environmental policy cooper-
ation within the EU. There are (at least) three interesting features that we
2would like to address. First, the federal level - to be called ’federal govern-
ment’ in what follows - is weak relative to the lower level (national) gov-
ernments1; at least in comparison with other economic federations such as
the U.S. This is so because the EU is still in the process of being developed,
and the member states may already have precommitted themselves to poli-
cies based on their own objectives. In addition, the federal government has
limited possibilities of rewarding and/or punishing individual member states
for their performance in controlling the transboundary parts of their envi-
ronmental damage. We will interpret this characteristic to mean that the
national governments act as ﬁrst movers vis-a-vis the federal government.
Second, the federal government typically decides upon environmental targets
for the members countries, which are implemented at the national level2.
For instance, the EU decides upon targets with regards to diﬀerent types
of water and air pollutants3, which are to be implemented at the national
level. In addition, although the rules governing these targets might be the
same for all countries involved, diﬀerences in the production structure or
other characteristics may, nevertheless, imply that the eﬀective targets diﬀer
across countries. Similarly, the Burden-Sharing Agreement within the EU4,
1Admittedly, without a proper constitution, European federalism is still in its infancy,
and the decision-process may also, at least to some extent, resemble negotiations be-
tween politically independent countries. In the political science and political geography
literature, the decision-making structure of the EU has been described as ’multi-level gov-
ernance’ based on a state-centrist setting. Jones and Clark (2001, page 2) argue that
”from this perspective, national governments are the main channels of communication
between the EU member states, thereby controlling the overall direction and pace of EU
decision-making”.
2See Wallace and Wallace (1997) for a survey of policy-making within the EU.
3See e.g. the Commission of The European Communities (2004).
4Details concerning the Burden Sharing Agreement can be found in the Commission
3which refers to the distribution of the CO2 reduction target for Europe, was
decided upon at the federal (EU) level, and the resulting national emission
targets will be implemented by policies decided upon by each national gov-
ernment. Third, if the lower level of government is described as being the
ﬁrst mover, it follows that the lower level governments may, in part, use their
policy instruments in order to inﬂuence the emission targets. Each of these
characteristics is part of the model described below. The main purpose of
our paper is to understand what these characteristics imply in the context
of optimal taxation at the national level.
Earlier research on environmental policy in economies with transboundary
environmental problems deals with the formation of coalitions as well as the
use of policy instruments to reach common objectives in such coalitions. One
body of literature deals primarily with game theoretic aspects of policy co-
operation, in which the incentives underlying the establishment of coalitions
is addressed5. Earlier studies in this area do not pay so much attention to
the question of how to implement a cooperative (or other) arrangement via
economic policy in the context of decentralized economies. Another body
of literature deals explicitly with implementation of such arrangements by
applying theories of optimal taxation or theories of policy reform to multi-
country model economies6. However, although we have gained much insight
of the European Communities (2000). See also Marklund and Samakovlis (2003) for an
empirical analysis of the incentives underlying the agreement.
5See e.g. Mäler (1989), Barrett (1994) and Carraro (2003).
6See e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992), Aronsson and Löfgren (2000), Aronsson
and Blomquist (2003) and Aronsson et al. (2004). In the ﬁrst two studies, the only task for
the government is externality-correction. Aronsson and Blomquist combine externality-
correction with redistribution, whereas Aronsson et al. analyze how the welfare eﬀects of
coordinated environmental policy reforms depend on the characteristics of the prereform
equilibrium.
4from earlier research, it has not (in our view) paid suﬃcient attention to
the institutional structure. The welfare eﬀects of public policies, as well as
attempts to coordinate policies between jurisdictions, cannot be thoroughly
analyzed, if one does not consider the institutional structure in which this
policy will be carried out. In many cases, earlier research just implies com-
parisons between a noncooperative equilibrium, where individual countries
and/or regions form their policies in isolation, with a cooperative equilibrium.
None of these two extreme cases provide a realistic description of the decision
structure underlying many practical environmental policy problems, where
the outcome often reﬂects a mixture of national and international policies.
To our knowledge, there are very few earlier studies dealing with envi-
ronmental policies in the context of a decentralized economic federation with
spillover eﬀects (across lower level jurisdictions) of environmental damage.
Silva and Caplan (1997) and Caplan and Silva (1999) analyze diﬀerent kinds
of transboundary environmental problems and associated policies to solve
them. These authors consider federal decision-structures, involving a federal
government and lower level (e.g. national or regional) governments; the fed-
eral government is assumed to control one speciﬁc policy instrument (e.g.
abatement), whereas the lower level of government is assumed to control
another (e.g. environmental taxes). In addition, the economic federation
may either be centralized or decentralized, depending on which level is able
to make credible commitments (and they use the EU to exemplify a de-
centralized economic federation)7. In their studies, a major purpose seems
to be to characterize the environmental policy outcomes on the basis of (i)
whether the economic federation is centralized or decentralized, and (ii) how
7See also the related work on public goods by Caplan et al. (2000) and on tax compe-
tition by Köthenburger (2004).
5the control over policy instruments is distributed between the two levels of
government.
Our study diﬀers from the papers discussed in the preceding paragraph in
several ways. First, we do not consider situations where the control of tradi-
tional policy instruments is divided between the two levels of government; we
assume, instead, that the targets decided upon by the federal government are
implemented by policies decided upon by the lower level governments. Sec-
ond, since our paper is related to the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation
in economies in environmental damage, it also diﬀers from the earlier studies
in terms of tax instruments. In our paper, the economic federation consists
of two lower level jurisdictions8, which will be referred to as ’countries’, and
the policy problem facing the government in each such country is a mixed
tax problem, where the set of tax instruments contains a nonlinear income
tax and linear commodity taxes. This is a reasonably realistic description of
the tax structure characterizing many countries. In addition, it means that
the use of distortionary taxation is a consequence of optimization; it is not
a consequence of restrictions imposed on the policy instruments. We assume
that the aggregate consumption of a particular commodity in each country
gives rise to an external eﬀect which, in turn, spills over into the other coun-
try. As such, the model bears some resemblance to the models used in earlier
literature on optimal income and commodity taxation under environmental
damage, such as Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson and Blomquist
(2003), although these earlier studies did not address the federation structure
discussed here.
However, instead of analyzing redistribution as part of the policy package,
as in some of the aforementioned papers, we follow Fuest and Huber (1997)
8Adding additional lower level jurisdictions does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
6and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a, 2004b) by disregarding motives for using
distortionary taxes that apply under perfect competition (such as asymmetric
information). Therefore, the presence of market failures constitutes the only
reason for using distortionary taxes in our paper. This does not reﬂect a belief
that other motives for using distortionary taxes are unimportant; only that
they are well understood from earlier research. As such, this simpliﬁcation
enables us to concentrate on how the decentralized federal decision-structure
contributes to the use of income and commodity taxation at the national
level9.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the model
and the outcome of private optimization. The federal decision-structure,
dealing with the policy problems facing the federal government and the lower
level governments, is introduced in section 3. Much attention is paid to the
optimal tax problems facing the lower level governments; a focus which makes
it possible to compare our results with those derived in earlier studies on envi-
ronmental policy in the context of optimal income and commodity taxation.
In section 4, we extend the analysis by relaxing one of the simplifying sepa-
rability assumptions on which the model is based. Section 5 summarizes the
results.
2 The Model
Consider an economic federation comprising two separate jurisdictions, de-
noted by subindices j =1 ,2, each of which will be referred to as a ’country’.
The consumers in each such country are identical, and their number will
9The mechanisms behind the tax structure discussed in this paper would, of course, also
be present in a more general framework with redistribution under asymmetric information.
7be normalized to one for notational convenience. Consumer preferences in
country j are represented by the utility function





for k  = j,w h e r ec will be referred to as a ’clean’ good and x a’ d i r t y ’g o o d ,
whereas z is leisure. We assume that c and x are normal goods. Leisure is, in
turn, deﬁned as a time endowment, H, less the time spent in market work, l.
The function aj(·) is increasing in each argument and strictly quasi-concave.
In addition, the consumption of the dirty good causes environmental damage,




decreasing and strictly concave in their respective argument. The assumption
that the external eﬀects enter in a separable way is made for convenience; we
will return to some of the implications of this assumption in section 4. We
also assume that the consumer in country j treats Ej and Ek as exogenous
during optimization.
The budget constraint facing the consumer is given by
wjlj − Tj(wjlj) − qj,ccj − qj,xxj =0 (2)
where wj i st h ew a g er a t ea n dTj (·) a general income tax, whereas qj,c and qj,x
are the consumer prices. The consumer prices are deﬁned as qj,c = pj,c + tj,c
and qj,x = pj,x + tj,x,w h e r ep denotes producer price and t commodity tax.
To simplify the analysis, we follow (much of the) earlier literature on mixed
taxation by assuming that the wage rate and producer prices are ﬁxed10.
The optimal tax problem to be examined in this paper will be deﬁned
in terms of a conditional indirect utility function and conditional demand
10This assumption is not important for the qualitative results derived below.
8functions. Therefore, following Christiansen (1984), it is convenient to solve
the consumer’s optimization problem in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we










bj = qj,ccj + qj,xxj
where bj is treated as a ﬁxed income. The solution deﬁnes the conditional
demand functions
xj = xj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j) (3)
cj = cj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j) (4)
and the conditional indirect utility function
vj = vj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j,E j,E k) (5)
for j =1 ,2,a n dk  = j.
In the second stage, the time spent in market work is chosen to maximize
the conditional indirect utility function subject to wjlj − Tj(wjlj) − bj =0 .










j(wjlj)=∂Tj(wjlj)/∂(wjlj) is the marginal income tax rate. This is
the standard labor supply condition and needs no further interpretation.
93 A Decentralized Economic Federation
As we mentioned in the introduction, earlier literature dealing with economic
policy in a multi-jurisdictional setting with transboundary environmental
problems typically compare a noncooperative Nash equilibrium with a co-
operative equilibrium (where the resource allocation is decided upon by a
global social planner). What would happen if we were to analyze these two
well known resource allocations within the model set out above? Although
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium and the cooperative equilibrium diﬀer
with respect to the value the decision-makers attach to the environment (the
noncooperative Nash equilibrium only internalizes the domestically created
external eﬀect, whereas the cooperative equilibrium fully internalizes the ex-
ternal eﬀects on a global level), they would, nevertheless, share at least two
important characteristics with regards to the tax structure. First, the com-
modity tax structure would obey the so called additivity property. The ad-
ditivity property, which is due to Sandmo (1975), means that environmental
damage leads to an additive term in the tax formula for the externality-
generating commodity, while it has no direct eﬀect on the tax formulas for
other commodities. Second, the marginal income tax rate would equal zero,
implying that the income tax would be equivalent to a lump-sum tax.
In this section, we will show that none of these characteristics apply
in the context of a decentralized economic federation, where the emission
targets are decided upon by the federal government and implemented at the
national level. As indicated above, we assume that the national governments
are ﬁrst movers vis-a-vis the federal government. The federal government
behaves as a traditional follower with one important exception; to be able
to deﬁne a target reaction function which is consistent with the ﬁrst order
10conditions of the private sector, we assume that the federal government sets
the emission targets as if it expects the implementation to be carried out via
the commodity tax on the dirty good. This will be explained below.
3.1 The Federal Government
We assume that the objective function of the central government is the sum





The constraints11 facing the federal government are the behavioral equations











qj,ccj + qj,xxj − bj =0 (9)
together with the restriction
Ej − xj =0 (10)
for j =1 ,2. Equation (8) represents the ﬁrst order condition for the commod-
ity mix chosen by the consumer in each country, equation (9) is the private
budget constraint, and equation (10) relates the environmental damage to
the consumption of the dirty good.
11In a more general framework, the federal government may also redistribute resources
between the countries. We abstract from redistributive policies carried out by the federal
government.
11Note that, since the federal government is assumed to choose Ej, while
at the same time recognizing equation (10), we cannot use equations (8) and
(9) to solve for cj and xj as functions of qj,c, qj,x, bj and zj (as we would
normally do when analyzing consumer behavior). Therefore, to be able to
formulate the federal government’s optimization problem, we must make an
additional assumption about the tradeoﬀs at the federal level. We assume
that the federal government expects that each emission target is implemented
via commodity the tax on the externality-generating good12;a ss u c h ,t h e
federal government presupposes that a lower xj must imply an increase in
qj,x along the demand curve for the dirty good. We can then use equations
( 8 )a n d( 9 )t os o l v ef o rqj,x and cj as functions of qj,c, xj, bj and zj, i.e.
qj,x = ˇ qj(qj,c,x j,b j,z j) and cj = ˇ cj(qj,c,x j,b j,z j). By using equation (10) to














for k =1 ,2,a n dk  = j.U s i n gt h eﬁrst order conditions, we can derive the
target reaction functions
ˇ Ej = ρj(qj,c,b j,z j) (12)
12This assumption appears to be realistic for the EU. Although implementation is typ-
ically a national decision problem, as indicated above, the Commission seems to support
the use of market based environmental policy instruments; see e.g. Communication from
the Commission (1997). In the context of our model, this is interpreted to mean that the
federal government expects that the implementation will be carried out via the commodity
tax on the dirty good instead of via the commodity tax on the clean good or the income
tax.
12for j =1 ,2,w h i c hd e ﬁne the targets for the environmental damage as a
function of (some of) the national decision variables. Note also that, since E1
and E2 are additively separable in terms of the utility functions, the reaction
function facing country j will only depend on its own decision variables; not
the decision variables of the other country. We will return to this assumption
in section 4.
3.2 Tax Policy at the National Level
We assume that the national governments behave as Nash competitors to-
wards each other, meaning that each national government treats the policy
variables of the other country as exogenous. The order of decision-making
in vertical space was indicated above; each national government behaves as
a ﬁrst mover vis-a-vis the federal government.
By using the conditional demand functions and the conditional indirect
utility function deﬁned in section 2, we can write the optimal tax problem
facing the goverment is country j as
Max
lj,bj,tj,c,tj,x,Ej
vj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j,E j,E k)
s.t.
wjlj − bj + tj,ccj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j)+tj,xxj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j) − ¯ gj =0
Ej − xj(qj,c,q j,x,b j,z j)=0
ρj(qj,c,b j,z j) − Ej ≥ 0
for k  = j,w h e r e¯ gj represents an exogenous revenue requirement. The ﬁrst
constraint is the budget constraint, in which we have used Tj(wjlj)=wjlj −
bj, whereas the second refers to the relationship between the environmental
13damage generated by country j and the consumption of the dirty good by
its resident. These two constraints take the same general form as in earlier
studies. The third constraint, on the other hand, is speciﬁc to the federal
decision structure discussed here. It means that the environmental damage
generated by country j m u s tn o te x c e e dt h et a r g e ti m p o s e do nc o u n t r yj by
the federal government, and the assumption that the national government
acts as a ﬁrst mover vis-a-vis the federal government implies, in turn, that it
can aﬀect the target, ρj(·), via some of its policy instruments.
The Lagrangean is written
Lj = vj(·)+γj[wjlj − bj + tj,ccj(·)+tj,xxj(·) − ¯ gj]+μj[Ej − xj(·)]
+λj[ρj(·) − Ej]
where γj, μj and λj are Lagrange multipliers, while the functions vj(·), cj(·),
xj(·) and ρj(·) were deﬁned above. If we concentrate on the case with a

















































13If the emission target constraint does not bind, then the resource allocation will be


















+ μj − λj =0 (17)
in which we have used the time constraint, z = H − l, to derive equation
(13) and Roy’s identity to write the ﬁrst order conditions for tj,c and tj,x in
the form of equations (15) and (16), respectively. Note also that the form
of equation (17) is due to the assumption that Ej is additively separable in
terms of the utility function. We will now analyze equations (13)-(17) from
the perspective of their implications for the tax structure.
3.3 The Shadow Price of the Environment
As in earlier literature, the shadow price of environmental damage over the
shadow price of the government’s budget constraint, μj/γj,i sa ni m p o r t a n t
part of the optimal tax structure. This ratio of shadow prices is interpretable
to measure the value that the government in country j attaches to reduced
domestic environmental damage. Let MWP
Ej,bj
j = −(∂vj/∂Ej)/(∂vj/∂bj)
denote the marginal willingness to pay by the resident in country j for a
small reduction in Ej,w h e r e a s˜ cj and ˜ xj denote the compensated demand
functions. To derive an expression for μj/γj,w ew i l lu s ee q u a t i o n s( 1 4 )a n d























Our result is summarized by Proposition 1;
15Proposition 1 In the context of the decentralized economic federation, the
shadow price of the domestic environmental damage over the shadow price























where σj =1− ∂˜ xj/∂Ej.
The ﬁrst part of the formula in Proposition 1 is the marginal willing-
ness to pay by the consumer for a reduction of the environmental damage,
whereas the second part represents tax base eﬀects of environmental damage
associated with the commodity taxes. Note that the tax base eﬀects are de-
ﬁned in terms of the compensated demand functions. The reason is that the
income tax is optimally chosen; a change in the revenues from commodity
taxation will, therefore, be complemented by a corresponding change in the
income tax to retain budget balance. These eﬀects are well understood from
earlier research. On the other hand, the third part on the right hand side
(which is proportional to λj/γj)i sn o v e l .T h i se ﬀect is associated with the
environmental target decided upon by the federal government, which is also
the reason why the formula in Proposition 1 diﬀers from the correspond-
ing expression derived in the context of a noncooperative Nash equilibrium
without a federal government14.
For purposes of interpretation, let us assume that λj/γj > 0,w h i c ha p -
pears to be natural considering that a relaxation of the target (if it is bind-
ing) is likely to increase the welfare level from the perspective of country j.
14See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003). In their study, μj/γj is also aﬀected by a self-
selection constraint, since they consider redistribution under asymmetric information as
being part of the decision problem facing each national government. See also the corre-
sponding optimal tax problem for a one-country model economy addressed by Pirttilä and
Tuomala (1997).
16Then, notice that the third part of the shadow price formula in Proposition
1 can be decomposed into two separate eﬀects; a direct eﬀect of Ej on the
target-related constraint facing the national government (which is deﬁned
conditional on the target function, ρj(·)) and an indirect eﬀect on the target
function via one of the decision variables facing the national government.
The direct eﬀect works to increase μj/γj; it means that the national govern-
ment is forced to attach a higher value on the environment than it would
otherwise have done. As we will see below, this eﬀect works to increase the
commodity tax on the dirty good. The indirect eﬀect appears because the
national government is a ﬁrst mover vis-a-vis the federal government. If an
increase in the private income relaxes (tightens) the target, so ∂ρj/∂bj > 0
(< 0), there is an incentive for the national government to choose a lower
(higher) income tax payment for the consumer than it would otherwise have
done. This is interpretable as an extra cost (beneﬁt) associated with rais-
ing tax revenues, which works to increase (decrease) the marginal cost of
public funds in utility terms. As such, it contributes to decrease (increase)
μj/γj. Therefore, the possibility to inﬂuence the environmental target may
have important implications for the value attached to the environment by
the government.
3.4 Commodity Taxation
The commodity tax structure is deﬁned by equations (15) and (16). Since we
will discuss the role of commodity taxation in the context of an optimal tax
structure, in which the income tax is also optimally chosen, we substitute
equation (14) into equations (15) and (16). Then, by using the Slutsky



























































By applying Cramer’s rule on equation system (18), we can derive ex-
pressions for the optimal commodity taxes (on an implicit form). Consider
Proposition 2;
Proposition 2 In the context of the decentralized economic federation, the













































To interpret Proposition 2, consider ﬁrst the special case without a fed-
eral decision-structure, meaning that ρj(·) ≡ 0. In this case, we obtain a
standard result; tj,c =0and tj,x = μj/γj,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the additivity prop-
erty. However, for our more general model, it is clear that the commodity
tax structure does no longer satisfy the additivity property; at least not if
we recognize that the policy instruments are, in part, used to inﬂuence the
environmental target decided upon by the federal government. Therefore,
although the real shadow price of environmental damage facing the govern-
ment, μj/γj, only appears in the tax formula for the dirty good, while it has
no direct eﬀect on the tax formula for the clean good, each tax formula also
contains expressions that are proportional to λj/γj. As such, these terms
18reﬂect that the national government uses income and commodity taxation
to aﬀect the environmental target. The basic intuition behind this lack of
additivity is that the national government has fewer policy instruments at
its disposal than it has variables to control.
Since the pure externality-part of the tax formula for the dirty good,
μj/γj, is well understood from earlier research, we concentrate the discussion
on the other components of the tax structure, all of which are due to the
desire to relax the emission target. Furthermore, we assume that λj/γj > 0,
which is in accordance with our earlier discussions. Consider ﬁrst the formula
for the commodity tax on the clean good, tj,c.T h e ﬁrst term within the
bracket reﬂects the direct eﬀect of tj,c on the environmental target. Since
∂˜ xj/∂qj,x < 0, it follows that ∂ρj/∂qj,c > 0 (< 0) provides an incentive for
the government to choose a higher (lower) tj,c than it would otherwise have
done. The intuition is, of course, that this adjustment contributes to relax
the emission target.












is due to budget balance arguments; a change in the commodity tax structure
may necessitate an adjustment of the income tax which, in turn, inﬂuences
the environmental target. This part is decomposable into two separate ef-
fects. One is a direct budget balance eﬀect (the terms proportional to cj). If
∂ρj/∂bj > 0 (< 0), then a lower (higher) income tax payment contributes to
relax the emission target. Given the revenue requirement, this constitutes an
incentive to adjust the commodity tax structure by increasing (decreasing)
tj,c, ceteris paribus. The other part of the budget balance eﬀect arises be-
19cause cj and xj are nonseparable in terms of the utility function; as such, it
may either reinforce or counteract the direct budget balance eﬀect discussed
before. To understand why nonseparability between goods constitutes addi-
tional information of importance for the commodity tax structure, recall that
the use of tj,c in this model is due solely to the desire to aﬀect the emission
target; there is no reason to use tj,c in order to directly distort the consump-
tion of the dirty good. Therefore, if ∂˜ xj/∂qj,c  =0 , there is an incentive to
adjust tj,x accordingly, so as to keep ˜ xj constant. The direction and strength
of this eﬀect are, in turn, dependent upon how the income tax aﬀects the
emission target. Let




be the be the induced change in tj,x, which is required to keep ˜ xj constant
(equal to ¯ xj) as tj,c increases marginally. Consider ﬁrst the case where the
commodities are complements, so dtj,x |˜ xj=¯ xj< 0, indicating that a marginal
increase in tj,c must be accompanied by a decrease in tj,x in order to keep
˜ xj constant. As can be seen from the formula for the commodity tax on the
clean good, if ∂ρj/∂bj > 0 (< 0), then this eﬀect constitutes an incentive
for the government to choose a lower (higher) tax on the clean good than
it would otherwise have done. The intuition is that the increased income
tax payment following the induced reduction of tj,x tightens (relaxes) the
emission target, which the government wants to avoid (accomplish). The
intuition goes the other way around if the two goods are substitutes, in
which case dtj,x |˜ xj=¯ xj> 0.
Turning to the tax formula for the dirty good, notice ﬁr s tt h a tt h es o
called budget balance eﬀects - summarized by the second part of the expres-
sion within the bracket - are analogous to, and have the same interpretations
20as, the corresponding terms in the tax formula for the clean good, which were
discussed at some length above. Therefore, we concentrate our interpreta-
tions to the ﬁrst term within the bracket. To understand this part of the tax
formula, it is necessary to bear in mind that tj,c directly aﬀects the emission
target, whereas tj,x does not; a result due to the assumptions underlying the
optimization problem of the federal government. This explains the asymme-
try between the tax formulas; the tax formula for the clean good contains a
direct eﬀect of qj,c on the emission target, whereas the tax formula for the
dirty good does not (for obvious reasons) contain a corresponding direct ef-
fect of qj,x on the target. To provide some intuition, let us rewrite the ﬁrst







where ∂˜ cj/∂qj,c < 0. Then, by observing that the government has no reason
to use tj,x for the explicit purpose of distorting the clean good, it becomes
convenient to deﬁne
dtj,c |˜ cj=¯ cj= −[(∂˜ cj/∂qj,x)/(∂˜ cj/∂qj,c)]dtj,x
to be the change in tj,c required to keep ˜ cj constant (equal to ¯ cj)a stj,x
increases marginally. Suppose ﬁrst that ∂ρj/∂qj,c > 0, implying that an
increase in the tax on the clean good relaxes the emission target. Then, if
the two goods are complements (substitutes), so dtj,c |˜ cj=¯ cj< 0 (> 0), then
there is an incentive to choose a lower (higher) commodity tax on the dirty
good than otherwise. The reason is, of course, that the government attempts
to relax the emission target via the induced change in the commodity tax for
the clean good. Instead, suppose that ∂ρj/∂qj,c < 0, in which case a higher
tax on the clean good tends to tighten the target. This situation means
21that if two goods are complements (substitutes), so dtj,c |˜ cj=¯ cj< 0 (> 0),
then there is an incentive to choose a higher (lower) commodity tax on the
dirty good, since the induced reduction (increase) in tj,c relaxes the emission
target.
3.5 Income Taxation
We argued in the beginning of section 3 that, if our framework is used in
the context of traditional models of noncooperative Nash behavior and co-
operative behavior, then the marginal income tax rate will be equal to zero
(recall that we abstract from asymmetric information). As a consequence,
the income tax would be equivalent to a lump-sum tax. However, this re-
sult does no longer apply in the decentralized economic federation. Consider
Proposition 3;
Proposition 3 In the decentralized economic federation, the marginal in-



























where tj,c and tj,x are deﬁned in Proposition 2.
Notice ﬁrst that the tax structure of traditional models appears as a
special case of the more general model analyzed here. This is so because, if
tj,c =0 , tj,x = μj/γj and ρj(·) ≡ 0, then it must also hold that T
j(wjlj)=0 .
Turning to the more general expression for the marginal income tax rate
in Proposition 3, recall from the commodity tax formulas in Proposition 2
that the direct externality-correcting component, μj/γj, enters additively in
the formula for tj,x, whereas it does not directly aﬀect the formula for tj,c.
22It follows from the second term on the right hand side of the expression in
Proposition 3 that the use of distortionary income taxation is not associated
with externality-correction per se. Instead, in our model, a nonzero marginal
income tax rate will reﬂect a combination of two motives; (i) the desire to
oﬀset distortions due to commodity taxation and (ii) the desire to relax the
emission target. This is intuitively reasonable, as we have fewer eﬀective
policy instruments than variables to control.
The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side, which are proportional to tj,c
and tj,x−μj/γj, respectively, are associated with the former motive for using
labor income taxation. As we saw in Proposition 2, the formulas for tj,c and
tj,x−μj/γj should be designed to relax the emission target. At the same time,
the higher each such tax, the more it may distort consumption (as represented
by the compensated demand functions), which provides an incentive to adjust
the marginal income tax rate accordningly. For instance, the higher tj,c at the
second best optimum, ceteris paribus, the higher (lower) will be the marginal
income tax rate, if leisure is complementary with (substitutable for) the clean
good in the sense that ∂˜ cj/∂zj > 0 (< 0). The intuition is that a higher
(lower) marginal income tax rate contributes to decrease (increase) the hours
of work. The term proportional to tj,x − μj/γj can be given an analogous
interpretation is terms of complementarity or substitutability between the
dirty good and leisure.
The third term on the right hand side is due to the desire to relax the
emission target. As such, it is decomposable into two parts. First, if more use
of leisure contributes to relax (tighten) the emission target, so ∂ρj/∂zj > 0
(< 0), there is an incentive to choose a higher (lower) marginal income tax
rate than otherwise. Second, if an increase in the private income relaxes
(tightens) the emission target, so ∂ρj/∂bj > 0 (< 0), there is an incentive
23for the government to increase (decrease) the private income, which can be
accomplished by a lower (higher) marginal income tax rate.
4 Relaxing Part of the Separability
In the model set out in section 2, and analyzed in section 3, the measures of
environmental damage, Ej and Ek, are assumed to be (i) additively separable
from the other goods in the utility function and (ii) additively separable from
each other. The ﬁrst assumption is not so important from our perspective;
it only means that consumption and hours of work are independent of the
environmental damage, and the consequences of this assumption are well
understood from earlier literature. The second assumption, on the other
hand, may be very important from the point of view of the incentive structure
in a decentralized economic federation. Although easily motivated by our
desire to concentrate on how each national government may inﬂuence its
own emission target (which we did in the previous section), the implications
of relaxing the second assumption should, at least, be discussed.
Therefore, suppose that we were to rewrite the instantaneous utility func-
tion facing the consumer to read
uj = aj(cj,x j,z j)+κj(Ej,E k) (19)
for k  = j,w h e r eEj and Ek are assumed to be substitutes. The special
case of perfect substitutability (meaning that Ej + Ek is the argument in
the function κj(·)) is interpretable as the climate problem associated with
greenhouse gas emissions.
In this case, by solving the corresponding optimization problem for the
federal government, we obtain the target reaction functions
24ˇ Ej = ρj(qj,c,b j,z j,q k,c,b k,z k) (20)
for j =1 ,2,a n dk  = j. This means that each national government is no
longer only able to aﬀect its own target; it is also able to aﬀect the target of
the other country.
By proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, therefore,
it is intuitively clear that an additional constraint ought to be added to
the optimization problem of the national government in country j;n a m e l y
ρk(qk,c,b k,z k,q j,c,b j,z j) − Ek ≥ 0. This means that the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for lj, bj and qj,c will contain an additional term, reﬂecting how each of
these variables aﬀects the emission target function of the other country. As a
consequence, this information will also be part of the optimal tax structure,
implying that additional terms (reﬂecting how these policy instruments af-
fect the other emission target function) should be added to the income and
commodity tax expressions presented above.
Our idea here is not to add technical details; only to argue that with this
extension, there would be an additional motive behind the tax policy, which
w a sn e g l e c t e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .T h ep o i n tw ew o u l dl i k et om a k eh e r e
is simply that, if Ej and Ek are not separable from each other in terms of
the utility function, each country does not use its policy instruments just
to relax its own target; it also uses these instruments in order to aﬀect the
emission target of the other country. We hope to develop these ideas in future
research.
255 Summary and Discussion
This paper deals with environmental policy in the context of a mixed tax
problem facing each national government in an economic federation. We
assume that the federal government chooses emission targets for the coun-
tries, which are implemented at the national level. Each national government
treats other national governments as Nash competitors. We also assume that
the economic federation is decentralized, meaning that the national govern-
ments are ﬁrst movers vis-a-vis the federal government in vertical space. Our
model is inspired by the decision-structure underlying the environmental pol-
icy within the EU.
The idea behind our study is to characterize the optimal tax structure;
it is not to establish whether taxes are higher or lower than in a standard
model. As such, we are able to describe why, and how, standard rules for
income and commodity taxation are modiﬁed. Our results suggest a strategic
motive for tax policy not discussed in earlier literature; each country uses
its policy instruments, at least in part, to inﬂuence the emission target.
This has several important implications for the optimal tax structure; ﬁrst
the commodity taxes do not satisfy the so called additivity property often
emphasized in earlier literature and, second, it provides an argument for
using distortionary labor income taxation.
Clearly, as we indicated in the introduction, European federalism is still
in its infancy, meaning that the it may not be entirely clear how the behavior
at the ’federal level’ ought to be described. At the same time, the basic issue
here is that the lower level (national) governments are able to commit to their
policies, implying that the ’federal outcome’, however deﬁned, is conditioned
on the policy variables decided upon at the national level. As long as this
26assumption is relevant, our analysis may shed light on the implications for
tax policy at the national level of being able, in part, to aﬀect the targets
decided upon by the federal level.
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